Oil and Wildlife Along the Frozen Arctic Coast: The Saga of a Federal-State Struggle Over the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Submerged Lands by Andreen, William L.
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1996 
Oil and Wildlife Along the Frozen Arctic Coast: The Saga of a 
Federal-State Struggle Over the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
Submerged Lands 
William L. Andreen 
University of Alabama - School of Law, wandreen@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles 
Recommended Citation 
William L. Andreen, Oil and Wildlife Along the Frozen Arctic Coast: The Saga of a Federal-State Struggle 
Over the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Submerged Lands, 1996-1997 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 331 
(1996). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/26 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. 
S U B M E R G E D L A N D S
Oil and Wildlife Along the Frozen Arctic Coast:
The Saga of a Federal-State Struggle Over the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
by William L. Andreen
William L. Andreen is the Edgar L.
Clarkson Professor of Law at the




In original jurisdiction cases, the
Supreme Court is both the trial
court and the appellate court.
However, the Court itself does not
hear an original jurisdiction case
in the first instance; instead, it
assigns the case to a Special
Master who, on behalf of the Court,
actually tries the issues presented.
After trial, the Special Master
presents a report and recommend-
ed decision to the Supreme Court.
In reviewing the report and
recommendation, the Court
functions in its familiar role as an
appellate court. The parties to the
case are entitled to contest the
Special Master's report and recom-
mendation by filing exceptions with
the Court. The Court then reviews
the report and recommendation of
the Special Master and any excep-
tions of the parties and makes a
decision. On occasion, as in this
case, the Court will hold oral argu-
ments on the exceptions before
reaching a decision.
The United States invoked the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, U.S. CONST'. art. III, § 2, 2,
in a dispute with Alaska over the
ownership of certain submerged
lands lying off the Arctic Coast of
Alaska. The lands at issue include
ecologically sensitive areas located
in or adjacent to the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge (the "Wildlife
Refuge" or the "Refuge").
The United States claims that cer-
tain submerged lands located within
three miles of the coast - lands
that ordinarily would have been
conveyed to Alaska at the time of
statehood - were retained by the
United States. Alaska, on the other
hand, claims that the Executive
Branch either lacked the legal
authority to retain ownership of
these lands or failed to exercise its
authority properly.
Although the dispute between the
United States and Alaska involves a
fairly obscure area of law, it is of
great practical importance because
oil and gas deposits may be present
offshore. Should Alaska prevail on
its claims to the submerged areas in
or along the edge of the Refuge, the
State appears likely to grant leases
permitting oil and gas exploration
and development in an area of rich
biological diversity.
(Continued on Page 332)
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Not just private individu-
als have disputes over
land ownership. In this
case which is nearing its
eighteenth anniversary,
the United States and
Alaska are in a tug of war
over ownership of off-
shore, submerged lands
which may contain oil
and gas reserves. Alaska
asserts ownership so it
can develop any reserves
that may exist; the
United States asserts
ownership to preserve
abundant fish and other






The Arctic Coast of Alaska is a
harsh and haunting place. The sun
never shines in winter and never
sets during the short Arctic sum-
mer. The coastal plain is tundra.
Trees do not grow here for none can
endure the darkness and winter
temperatures that sometimes sink
below minus-70 degrees Fahrenheit.
Only a few inches below the tundra
lies permafrost.
While forbidding to humans, the
coastal plain and its offshore waters
are rich in wildlife; this is true espe-
cially of the Wildlife Refuge which is
one of the more primitive and iso-
lated areas on earth. Encompassing
over 18 million acres in northeast-
ern Alaska, the Refuge was set aside
to protect a uniquely productive fish
and wildlife habitat.
In the short Alaska summer, thou-
sands of caribou roam the tundra
within the Refuge and, with millions
of mosquitoes in hot pursuit, the
caribou often take cover in the salty
coastal water. Joining the caribou
on the coastal plain are large
numbers of grizzly bears, musk
oxen, wolves, and Arctic foxes. The
coastal lagoons and marshes, mean-
while, teem with fish which attract
migratory birds in abundance and
encourage polar bears to den in the
vicinity.
Valuable oil and gas deposits,
however, are thought to be present
along the northern coastline.
Indeed, it is the presence of these
deposits that makes the ownership
dispute over the Refuge's offshore,
submerged lands all the more
salient, especially because oil and
gas production was prohibited by
Congress in 1980 when it enlarged
the Refuge. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (1994)
(no oil or gas development or pro-
duction in the Wildlife Refuge "until
authorized by an act of Congress").
The United States commenced this
action against the State of Alaska in
an effort to exert ownership over a
relatively small portion of the
coastal seabed lying near the exist-
ing oil-producing area of Prudhoe
Bay. Alaska, in turn, counterclaimed
against the United States, seeking
an order declaring its title to a
broader range of submerged lands,
including submerged lands lying
inside the barrier islands located
along the northern edge of the
Refuge.
It has long been recognized that
states, upon admission to the Union,
succeed the United States in the
ownership of lands underlying navi-
gable waters located inside state
boundaries. Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212
(1845). This rule is sometimes
referred to as the Equal Footing
Doctrine in recognition of the fact
that when the 13 colonies became
states they took ownership of the
lands beneath their navigable
waters, and the view that new states
should have the same ownership
rights as the original states.
The Equal Footing Doctrine was
clarified, or perhaps qualified, in
1947 when the Supreme Court
declared that national rights were
supreme in the water and lands
lying seaward of the coastline.
United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19 (1947). Therefore, while
states receive title to lands underly-
ing inland waters such as rivers and
lakes, the United States retained
title to the lands beneath the
three-mile territorial sea.
Congress acted in 1953 to undo
the holding of United States v.
California by passing the
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
1301-1315 (1994), which grants
coastal states title to offshore, sub-
merged lands extending three miles
to sea. But the Submerged Lands
Act also provides that coastal states
do not take title to "lands expressly
retained by ... the United States
when the state entered the Union
.... "43 U.S.C. § 1313(a).
The Supreme Court in United
States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253
(1980), held that the Submerged
Lands Act was a proper exercise of
Congress' constitutional authority to
transfer and dispose of federal prop-
erty. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, 2.
When Alaska became a state in
1959, it joined the Union pursuant
to the terms of the Alaska Statehood
Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat.
339 (1958), which explicitly applied
the provisions of the Submerged
Lands Act. Alaska, therefore,
received title to the offshore, sub-
merged lands within three miles of
the coastline except, in the words of
the Submerged Lands Act, for those
lands "expressly retained by ... the
United States" at the time of state-
hood. While the Alaska Statehood
Act provided, in general, that the
United States would retain title to
all public lands in Alaska, a number
of exceptions were made including
public lands used for the conserva-
tion and protection of Alaskan
fisheries and wildlife. Such conser-
vation land would be transferred to
Alaska unless it had been "with-
drawn or otherwise set apart as
refuges or reservations for the protec-
tion of wildlife." 72 Stat. at 340-41.
In 1957, while Alaska was still a ter-
ritory, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries
and Wildlife of the United States
Department of the Interior (the
"Wildlife Bureau") submitted an
application for withdrawal to the
Secretary of the Department of the
Interior (the "Interior Secretary" or
the "Secretary"), seeking to set
aside a large area of public lands in
the northeastern part of the
Territory of Alaska, an area that is
now the Wildlife Refuge. The
Issue No. 5332
Interior Secretary, however, did not
formally withdraw the area and
create the Refuge until December
1960, almost two years after Alaska
had attained statehood in January
1959.
Although the United States and
Alaska agree that the upland areas
in the Wildlife Refuge were properly
withdrawn and remained in federal
ownership after Alaska's statehood,
they disagree about which govern-
mental entity owns the offshore,
submerged lands lying along the
northern rim of the Refuge. The
northern boundary of the Refuge is
defined as the "line of extreme low
water, including all offshore bars,
reefs, and islands." The question,
consequently, is whether lands
under the tidally influenced waters
along the northern rim of the
Refuge - lagoons, tidelands, and so
on - lying between the mainland
and the offshore bars, reefs, and
islands were withdrawn as part of
the Refuge or form a portion of
Alaska's three-mile coastal belt
under the Submerged Lands Act.
If they were withdrawn, they belong
to the United States; if they were
not, they belong to Alaska.
CASE ANALYSIS
Alaska contends that only Congress
could reserve United States owner-
ship of the offshore, submerged
lands. In other words, Alaska argues
that the attempt to withdraw the
land composing the Refuge by the
Wildlife Bureau and Interior
Secretary's post-statehood action
approving the withdrawal applica-
tion were insufficient to establish
the United States' ownership over
the submerged lands adjacent to
the Refuge.
The United States, by contrast,
argues that the reservation of the
onshore lands for the Refuge also
encompassed a reservation of off-
shore, submerged lands. According
to the United States, not only could
the Executive Branch, acting
through the Interior Secretary,
effectively withdraw the lands, it
did so by virtue of a substantive
administrative rule under which a
withdrawal application "shall tem-
porarily segregate such lands from
settlement ... lease, and other
forms of disposal under the public
lands laws . .. ."
This and related questions were
briefed and argued before Special
Master J. Keith Mann who then rec-
ommended that the Court hold that
the application for withdrawal and
its subsequent approval by the
Interior Secretary which created the
Refuge had not withdrawn any tidal-
ly influenced submerged lands from
Alaska's ownership. While the
Special Master found that the with-
drawal application together with the
administrative rule temporarily seg-
regated the submerged lands of the
Wildlife Refuge for wildlife protec-
tion purposes, he further found that
they did not have the effect of per-
manently setting the area apart as a
refuge under the language of the
Alaska Statehood Act. In other
words, the Special Master ruled that
the offshore, submerged lands at
issue were not "withdrawn or other-
wise set apart as refuges or reserva-
tions" because the Interior
Secretary did not approve the
Wildlife Bureau's application until
after the date of statehood. In fact,
the Special Master was quite trou-
bled by the prospect that had the
Secretary rejected the application,
the lands, if deemed withdrawn or
set apart by the application, might
remain in federal hands, even
though the Secretary later found no
real need for the withdrawal.
Recognizing the possibility that the
Supreme Court might reject his rec-
ommendation, the Special Master
addressed the issue that would arise
in the event the Wildlife Bureau's
withdrawal application were deemed
effective by the Court: What off-
shore, submerged lands were cov-
ered by the application? After dis-
cussing the boundary description
and various other indications of
intent, the Special Master concluded
that the offshore, submerged lands
in question were within the intend-
ed borders of the Wildlife Refuge.
The United States contests the
Special Master's recommendation
concerning the ineffectiveness of
the Wildlife Bureau's withdrawal
request. It argues that the Special
Master's distinction between setting
land aside as a refuge as opposed to
a temporary segregation to protect
wildlife is formalistic and inconsis-
tent with the normal use of these
words. According to the United
States, if Congress had meant to
retain title only to lands that had
been conclusively dedicated to a
public purpose, it would have used
only the word "reservation" in the
Alaska Statehood Act, rather than
the broader terminology of "lands
withdrawn or otherwise set apart as
refuges." (Emphasis supplied.) In
fact, the statutory phrase "otherwise
set apart as refuges" well describes
lands that have been set aside for
that purpose by administrative
request, pending further administra-
tive or legislative action.
The United States also addresses the
Special Master's concern over own-
ership of the Refuge's offshore, sub-
merged lands in the event the
Interior Secretary eventually denied
the Wildlife Bureau's withdrawal
request. In that event, says the
United States, it would continue to
own the offshore, submerged lands
until such time as Alaska could con-
vince Congress to convey them to
the State - a not unlikely prospect,
says the United States, given the
fact that the Wildlife Refuge might
never have come into existence
because of the Interior Secretary's
(Continued on Page 334)
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failure to act of the withdrawal
application prior to Alaska's
statehood.
Alaska, on the other hand, main-
tains that the Special Master was
correct in concluding that the
Wildlife Bureau's withdrawal
application failed to set these lands
aside. For example, the withdrawal
application did not effectuate a
transfer of administrative jurisdic-
tion over the segregated lands from
the Bureau of Land Management to
the specific office within the
Department of the Interior responsi-
ble for managing formally designat-
ed refuges.
Alaska argues further that the leg-
islative history fails to demonstrate
that Congress considered the
Wildlife Bureau's application alone
as sufficient to set lands apart.
In fact, the Deputy Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior opined
in 1959 that another prestatehood
application for withdrawal of sub-
merged lands did not prevent their
passing to Alaska.
On a more fundamental level,
however, Alaska relies on the Equal
Footing Doctrine to claim that the
land at issue would have passed to it
even if a formal order creating the
Refuge had been issued prior to
statehood. Alaska argues that the
strong presumption against divest-
ing a state's entitlement to lands
underlying inland navigable waters
extends to offshore, submerged
lands. Indeed, Alaska maintains that
the Submerged Lands Act was
intended to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v.
California and to apply the Equal
Footing Doctrine to offshore, sub-
merged lands. Thus, in Alaska's
view, only Congress can defeat a
future state's title in offshore, sub-
merged lands prior to statehood
and, then, only in the most extreme
of circumstances and using the
clearest of terms.
The United States responds that,
although the Department of the
Interior agency administering the
Refuge did not change at the time
the withdrawal application was
made, the area thenceforth was
administered in accordance with
the rules governing wildlife refuges.
The United States also points out
that the opinion of the Deputy
Solicitor relied upon by Alaska was
repudiated in a published decision
rendered by the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior.
Finally, the United States calls
attention once again to United
States v. California as well as to a
subsequent line of Supreme Court
cases that refused to extend the
Equal Footing Doctrine to coastal,
submerged lands. Although the
United States concedes that the
Submerged Lands Act made a sub-
stantial grant of federal lands to
coastal states, it insists that the
grant was limited. In other words,
the Court's decision in United
States v. California was not
annulled by the Submerged Lands
Act because the statute withheld
from a state "all lands expressly
retained by or ceded to the United
States when the state entered the
Union . . . " 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a).
SIGNIFICANCE
This case presents yet another con-
test between development and
preservation. If Alaska prevails, it
will have the sole authority to
decide if the offshore, submerged
lands of the Wildlife Refuge will be
opened to oil and gas exploration
and production. Indeed, Alaska
officials have indicated that they
expect to grant exploration and
production rights as soon as 1999.
If the United States prevails, such




For the United States (Walter
Dellinger, Acting Solicitor General;
(202) 514-2217).
For the State of Alaska (Counsel of
Record: Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney
General of the State of Alaska;
(907) 465-3600).
AMIcus BRIEFS
In support of the United States
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